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1966/10/26

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

SANITIZED

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CM-1856-66
26 October 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Report of the CJCS Special Studies Group on Alternative US Strategies for Communist China (U)

Reference: Draft Memorandum to the President on Recommended Army and Marine Corps General Purpose Forces, Fiscal Years 1967-1971 (U)

1. (~~TS~~) On 21 January 1966 the CJCS Special Studies Group was directed to conduct a study which would develop and evaluate, within overall US strategy,

The purpose of the study was to provide assessments of alternative courses of action to achieve military objectives which would cause Communist China to discontinue aggression. Minimization of the risk of Soviet involvement in direct military support of China or in military action elsewhere was a major consideration in the selection of objectives.

2. (U) The CJCS Special Studies Group has completed the study. In view of the interest in the general subject matter which you expressed in the above reference, the report is forwarded herewith.

3. (U) The study has not yet been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is being forwarded concurrently to each of the Services and to the Joint Staff. The comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be forwarded to you after the study has been reviewed.

Earle G. Wheeler
EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure
A/S

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 87-106
By ajg, NARA, Date 6-16-88

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VOLUME I

ALTERNATIVE U.S. STRATEGIES FOR COMMUNIST CHINA (U)

SHORT TITLE: LOSAC (U)

CHAIRMAN
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SPECIAL STUDIES GROUP
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES BRANCH

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 89-121 + DOE 12-21-78 letter
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BASIC REPORT

ALTERNATIVE US STRATEGIES FOR COMMUNIST CHINA (U)

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PART II. OBSERVATIONS

A. (S) PREFACE

At the outset it is emphasized that the study scenario postulates a deteriorating Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army (VC/NVA) effort in South Vietnam as a rationale for the intervention of the CHICOMs. The study recognizes, however, that there is a substantial residual insurgency threat during this period. All three strategies include consideration of this rear area threat and provide some 12 to 14 divisions to cope with it. From the evaluation of the capability of Communist China/North Vietnam (CHICOM/NVN) to invade Southeast Asia, certain major observations are made concerning the feasibility of conducting limited objective strategies to defeat or cause the withdrawal of the CHICOM/NVN forces.

B. (S) THE ENEMY

An in-depth assessment of CHICOM/NVN capabilities to conduct military operations in the South China - Southeast Asia area brings several important factors to light. In spite of a huge land force, there are definite limitations in the number of divisions which can be employed effectively in operations in this area. The land force threat of 19 CHICOM/NVN divisions in Southeast Asia postulated in this study appears to be a reasonable estimate considering logistic constraints, the LOC structure and climatic conditions. Although the CHICOMs have large manpower reserves which can be deployed in defense of critical areas of mainland China, the majority of this force is positioned either north of the Yangtze River or opposite Taiwan. The CHICOM air forces, although numerically large, are obsolescent, basically defense-oriented and incapable of sustained operations due to inadequate logistic support. The CHICOM Navy is primarily a small coastal defense force; except for some mining capability and a relatively inferior submarine fleet, it poses no sustained threat in the South China - Southeast Asia area.

C. (S) MOVEMENT IN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

The area of operations, primarily Southeast Asia and China south of the Yangtze River, presents many obstacles to the conduct of large-scale ground operations, principally

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because of the marginal LOC structure, the ruggedness of much of the terrain and periods of adverse weather. After initial US/Allied interdiction of the rail lines, the CHICOMs will be restricted to movement by truck or foot over a primitive road network. US/Allied forces have a relative advantage in the same area of operations because of air mobility, greater engineer and construction capability and open sea LOC.

D. (S) CONTROL OF THE SEA

Although a war game of the control of the sea aspects of the study strategies is not conducted, analysis of CHICOM/NVN capabilities as opposed to US/Allied capabilities indicates that control of the sea can be gained quickly by US/Allied forces within the naval force structure programmed for Southeast Asia by 1967. Although the CHICOMs have a mining capability, this threat can be reduced to a point where it will not interfere materially with either attack carrier operations or the amphibious operations envisioned. The relatively few submarines which would be employed by the CHICOMs in the South China Sea and adjacent waters may pose an initial but not a sustained threat.

E. (S) THE AIR SUPERIORITY BATTLE

Analysis of the air superiority war game indicates that, regardless of the CHICOMs' tactical allocation of aircraft, US forces can gain air superiority early in the war; in the game the range was from three to seven days. Moreover, the air battle results in the destruction of most of the CHICOM air forces committed to Southeast Asia. This commitment constituted approximately 50 percent of the enemy total force. The use of COFRAM is of major importance in destroying CHICOM aircraft on South China airfields. The majority of US air losses are in air-to-air engagements. During the air superiority battle, US/Allied air forces are also able to provide substantial tactical air support to land forces. The early achievement of air superiority with minimum losses results in the availability of sufficient aircraft to conduct a high level of interdiction as well as continued close air support of land forces.

F. (S) DEFENSE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

The US/Allied land, air and naval forces, currently programmed for Southeast Asia, are assessed as being adequate to contain the CHICOM/NVN forces forward of key air and logistic complexes under the situation postulated for the area in the November 1967 time frame.

G. (TS) INTERDICTION

In order to examine interdiction options which might be useful in countering a CHICOM/NVN threat, two different approaches are explored. One, associated with the Alpha Strategy, is a deep interdiction program which includes targeting of CHICOM industrial as well as military facilities and LOC. The interdiction program associated with Charlie Strategy and, to some extent, the Bravo Strategy, is an effort in which the primary targeting emphasis is against the South China - Southeast Asia LOC complex. In addition, the Bravo Strategy concentrates on reducing the CHICOM capability to reinforce against the US invasion of South China. In terms of level of air effort, approximately the same number of aircraft are required. The results of Alpha and Charlie interdiction efforts are considerably different. Alpha results in the destruction of major military logistic and industrial complexes in South China and selectively in North China, thereby reducing their war supporting capability and demonstrating to the CHICOMs the increasing cost of pursuing aggression by seriously disrupting their long range economic and military programs. The Charlie Strategy interdiction effort so weakens the CHICOM/NVN forces through the destruction of the LOC that the invading forces are rendered incapable of continuing effective offensive operations.

H. (TS) AIRBORNE/AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

Two airborne/amphibious operations are analyzed in the study, one in North Vietnam employing up to eight US/Allied divisions and the other in South China employing 14 US divisions. The purpose of each is to place land forces across the principal CHICOM/NVN LOC leading to Southeast Asia and thereby cause the withdrawal or destruction of CHICOM/NVN forces supported by the LOC. Except for tactical air forces and amphibious shipping, the Charlie Strategy requires no

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forces beyond those in the active US forces and the invasion phase could be conducted within three to four months of the initiation of hostilities. The Bravo Strategy, on the other hand, requires the selective mobilization of Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps reserve forces. Because of the time required for this and the weather cycle in Southeast Asia and South China, the invasion phase cannot be executed earlier than 12 months after the CHICOM/NVN invasion. These amphibious operations are a feasible and positive means of causing the withdrawal or destruction of CHICOM/NVN forces in Southeast Asia. An important element which relates to their success, however, concerns the feasibility of time-phased logistic support of the amphibious operations. Analysis of each of the strategies indicates that it is possible to provide the logistic support required.

I. (S) US FORCE MOBILIZATION

To execute any of the strategies with conventional weapons requires mobilization of US reserve forces. For all three strategies, there is a requirement to mobilize most of the Air National Guard (ANG) tactical air squadrons. For Bravo and Charlie Strategies, there is the additional requirement to mobilize selected naval reserve forces, particularly amphibious shipping. For Bravo Strategy, there is a requirement to mobilize six and two-thirds reserve component divisions. In all strategies there is a temporary drawdown of some NATO earmarked forces. This mobilization and temporary withdrawal of selected NATO earmarked assets permit a timely and positive response to the CHICOM aggression.

J. (S) LOGISTICAL IMPLICATIONS

1. (S) The logistical implications associated with the strategies fall generally into two categories: procurement of necessary materiel and supplies and providing the infrastructure and LOC to support the engaged forces.

2. (S) With respect to procurement, analysis indicates that based on the estimated requirements and duration of conflict in each strategy, there would be shortages of war reserve, unit and replacement equipment which, if not procured and stockpiled, would degrade the effectiveness of the proposed strategies or delay their execution. Among the more important requirements are replacement aircraft, air

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and ground munitions and engineer equipment. The degree to which these shortages would degrade the strategies depends in large part on the date of initiating additional procurement.

3. (S) Current estimates by CINCPAC indicate that the LOC and base complexes in Thailand will be adequate to support large forces by 1968. The LOSAC strategies are postulated for execution by late 1967. Acceleration in airfield construction and improvement in port and LOC structure would provide an additional assurance that the logistic support of the study strategies could be accomplished with a greater margin of safety.

4. (S) Theater and CONUS logistic resources will also be required to be in place on Taiwan to support air operations and the staging of land forces.

K. (TS) [

3(2)(i)

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5. (TS) [

1.3(a)(1)

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[22]

CONCLUSIONS

[23]

PART III. CONCLUSIONS

A. (U) PREFACE

The conclusions contained herein are addressed to the study objectives and based primarily on the analysis of the three basic strategies. Additional conclusions are reached based upon the excursions which were developed to determine their effect on the strategies.

B. (TS) DEFEAT OF CHICOMS BY CONVENTIONAL FORCES

1. (S) Analysis of the CHICOM/NVN threat and the US/Allied forces which can oppose it indicate that given the situation postulated, the limited objectives and total programmed US forces, each of the three nonnuclear strategies provides a feasible course of action to achieve the objective of causing withdrawal of CHICOM forces from Southeast Asia. The remaining alternative option open to the CHICOMs is to continue the conflict in the hope of achieving a stalemate. However, this option subjects them to ever increasing destruction of their military and economic base.

2. (S) Alpha Strategy provides a means of making CHICOM aggression in Southeast Asia so expensive in terms of loss of military and industrial capability and potential that its continuation becomes almost prohibitive when viewed from the standpoint of both CHICOM short and long range national objectives. The strategy can be executed within programmed active forces plus some ANG tactical units.

3. (TS) Bravo Strategy, which requires the longest preparation time and the greatest land force commitment, achieves the shock effect of attacking the CHICOMs on the mainland and though geographically limited, provides a means of causing the CHICOMs to withdraw their forces from Southeast Asia or face increasing and prohibitive losses.

4. (S) Charlie Strategy, which except for some additional amphibious shipping and some ANG tactical units, can be executed within programmed active forces, provides a means of achieving initial campaign objectives during a single dry season and forcing an early CHICOM decision to withdraw or face destruction of their forces in detail. Additionally, this strategy offers a means for initiating the early reunification of Vietnam.

C. (S) PRODUCTION IMPLICATIONS

Concerning the nonnuclear strategies, there is a requirement to provide munitions, replacement aircraft and long lead time items of equipment in sufficient quantities to support operations for a period of 180 days up to a year. Inasmuch as the resources required are greater than those provided for in current programs, any reduction in these defense programs, as a result of US/Allied success in South Vietnam, would affect adversely the US capability to implement the strategies. However, if the possibility of CHICOM intervention is accepted, an early decision to mobilize men and resources will improve the US readiness to react to the postulated threat and may deter the CHICOM aggression.

D. (S)

1.3(a)(5) (2)

F. (S) LOSS OF US BASES IN JAPAN

Loss of US base rights in Japan would have an impact on the PACOM logistic systems of all services; however, this loss would not seriously affect operations in Southeast Asia. The loss of Japanese industrial support rather than loss of base rights per se, may well have the more significant impact on the logistic support of US/Allied forces in Southeast Asia.

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MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES

(26)

PART IV. MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES

A. (U) PREFACE

Uncertainties discussed herein are the major study uncertainties. Additionally, in the appropriate appendices, uncertainties are discussed which are peculiar to a specific strategy, an operational phase of a strategy, or an excursion.

B. (S) THREAT

1. (S) The threat, as described herein for mid-1967, is based on current DIA estimates. Any significant changes in the world situation such as an escalation of the war in Southeast Asia, disruption of NATO or an anti-Western alignment of the so-called unaligned nations of the UN, particularly those in the Pacific area, could change the situation drastically with corresponding impact on the intelligence estimates upon which the strategies are based.

2. (S) The initial ground threat, as developed in this study, is based on a DIA study* of the logistic throughput capacity of the LOC leading from South China into Southeast Asia. Based on the LOC capacity and the daily logistic requirements of CHICOM/NVN divisions, the maximum number of divisions which can be supported in Southeast Asia is developed. Although the threat developed in this study is within reasonable range of previous and present estimates of the CHICOM/NVN ground threat, improvements of the LOC or the possibility that the DIA estimates are low could affect the postulated threat.

3. (S) Similarly, the threat postulated as capable of opposing an airborne/amphibious invasion of South China constitutes an uncertainty. The study threat was based on current CHICOM deployments with additional consideration of their mobilization capability. Many factors could influence the size of the actual threat at the time of the proposed landing.

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* DIA Study, "Chinese Communist Military Logistics and Capabilities (C)," dated 1 March 1966

C. (S) STRATEGIC WARNING

Based on intelligence estimates, a period of 60 days at a maximum rate of movement would be required by the CHICOMs to position their forces for an invasion of Southeast Asia. In 30 days, these forces would be closed on the South China border; the remaining 30 days would be required to move them to forward assembly areas in Laos and North Vietnam. This study postulates that when the CHICOM forces reach the South China border, intelligence concerning their subsequent employment is sufficiently firm to warrant initiation by the highest national authority of action to counter the threat, including the mobilization of appropriate reserve forces. A shorter period of warning or a delay in reaction to the threat would affect the US/Allied capability to deploy forces in conformance with the study strategic concepts. Some forward bases could be lost before the situation was stabilized.

D. (S) PROGRESS OF CURRENT OPERATIONS

The study scenario, which provides the rationale for the CHICOM intervention, assumes a deteriorating VC/NVA posture resulting from increased US/Allied operational effectiveness in North and South Vietnam. If, in fact, the planned level of US forces and attendant increase in operational effectiveness does not occur by late 1967, additional forces will be required to suppress VC/NVA insurgency while the CHICOM threat is being met.

E. (S) LOGISTIC BUILDUP, SOUTHEAST ASIA

The study postulates that present and planned improvements in the LOC and infrastructure in South Vietnam and Thailand would be completed, in some instances at an accelerated rate. A failure to complete the planned improvements, particularly in Thailand, would require review of the level of forces which could be deployed and sustained.

F. (S) MUNITIONS CONSIDERATIONS

Shortages are indicated for 500 pound Snakeye and 750 pound General Purpose bombs, 5-inch Zuni rockets, and certain types of 20mm ammunition, which will have an impact on the capability to execute the strategies. Improved weapons such as the Walleye, if operationally proven and available in the

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1967-68 time frame, could materially offset the impact of projected munitions shortages and would have the additional effect of reducing substantially the total aircraft sortie requirements.

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RELATED
CONSIDERATIONS

PART V. RELATED CONSIDERATIONS

A. (S) GENERAL

All studies are sensitive to the assumptions made and the situation postulated and can be challenged on this basis. LOSAC is no exception. However, a study is of value to the degree that the assumptions and the scenario postulated are credible and to the extent that they encompass a reasonable range of possible situational variations. It can also be anticipated that military and political constraints that pertain to the present conflict in Southeast Asia will obscure at least part of the rationale of the LOSAC study which is based on an overt invasion in force of the area. To point up this distinction, as well as to provide insight into key study assumptions, the following discussion of certain major considerations related to the three strategies is offered.

B. (TS) IMPLICATIONS OF A ROLLBACK CONCEPT

One reaction to the problem of CHICOM invasion is to consider a rollback operational concept whereby the enemy forces are pushed back to their own borders. Superficially, this appears to be an appropriate and measured responce. However, the actual force required to accomplish this is as great or greater than the total force required for the Bravo Strategy with far fewer tangible and long term results. The LOC in China can support 124 divisions along the South China border. The LOC in Southeast Asia leading to initial CHICOM objectives, however, can support only 19 engaged divisions. Therefore, as it is pushed north the CHICOM/NVN force could theoretically expand from 19 to an ultimate limit of 124 divisions. While the CHICOMs are moving into a better LOC structure, the US/Allied forces are moving into areas of restricted LOC. The terrain on which the battle is fought also favors the defender. Finally, assuming that a successful rollback campaign is concluded, the US/Allies would gain little, and the DMZ would then stretch along the southern periphery of China from North Vietnam to Burma. Despite a major military struggle, high in personnel casualties and with considerable expenditure of logistic resources, a significant enemy force could still remain and the campaign would have been relatively indecisive.

C. (TS) WAR INITIATION

There are a number of options open to the CHICOMs within the time frame of the study which differ from the initiation of hostilities visualized by the study group. It is quite conceivable that the CHICOMs initially could confine their effort to South Vietnam by infiltrating forces through North Vietnam and Laos. In this case, the principal problem for the CHICOMs would be one of supporting the forces as they grew in size. For the United States, the major problem would lie in the assessment of CHICOM intentions since indications of impending attack would be less clear than those postulated in the study. As a result, early reaction to the threat could be less decisive and, even after engagement, there could be continued restraints on direct attacks against China until significant CHICOM forces are engaged and their intentions become clear. If the CHICOMs elect this option, a greater period of time could be required by the US/Allies to achieve stabilization than is envisioned in the study strategies. Should the CHICOMs mount an attack in force through Laos and North Vietnam against South Vietnam alone, the threat would be more clearly signalled and would permit more time to reposition US/Allied forces. In either case, there would probably be less strategic warning post-decision time than in the study postulated situation because of the greater difficulty in determining enemy intentions due to the more limited buildup. Any CHICOM invasion variations which have Bangkok as well as Saigon as an objective would be difficult to conceal because of the necessity of moving sizable forces into Laos and Burma in advance of the attack. Although uncertainty exists as to size, direction and method of CHICOM intervention involving significant forces, it is believed that by meeting the maximum threat, lesser elements of the threat can be defeated even though initial US reaction is delayed or uncertain.

D. (S) IMPROVEMENT OF ARVN CAPABILITIES

1. (S) In determining the adequacy of the US/Allied force structure, an analysis was made of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN). This analysis focuses on comparing the combat capability of this force with the enemy forces in the area to determine whether it is feasible to make improvements which would increase the ARVN combat capability. If feasible, this would reduce the requirements for outside forces or permit

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use of these other forces for offensive operations at an earlier date. This analysis is made because a comparison of the relative combat capabilities of Allied and communist forces indicates that the ARVN organization is relatively weak.

2. (S) The fighting strength of NVA battalion exceeds that of the ARVN by 112, although the overall personnel strength of the ARVN battalion exceeds that of the NVA battalion by 34. Additionally, as noted in Figure 1, the NVA battalion is twice as effective as an ARVN battalion in terms of overall firepower potential. This is due to the higher concentration of automatic weapons and the greater number and higher caliber of mortars, recoilless rifles and rocket launchers.

3. (S) Figure 2 indicates one alternative to the present TO&E of the ARVN battalion which would increase their firepower potential (FPP) to place it on a par with that of the NVA battalion. There are other similar alternatives which would increase the FPP of the ARVN battalion and which would not require major reorganization and training.

4. (S) Presently the 90 battalions in the ten ARVN divisions have the FPP of 90 VC or 45 NVA battalions. This relationship indicates that to engage in successful offensive operations the ARVN would require two to three battalion superiority over the VC and four to six battalion superiority over the NVA. The size of the ARVN force, required to do a given job, creates additional problems of reaction time, control and logistic support. Doubling the present FPP would equate the ten ARVN divisions to 180 VC or 90 NVA battalions.

5. (S) It is, of course, well recognized that firepower potential alone is not a full measure of overall combat effectiveness, but an improvement along these lines could enhance the US/Allied capability to meet and defeat the threat.

E. (TS) COMMITMENT OF CHICOM FORCES

1. (TS) There are several possibilities to be considered concerning the rationale for the overall employment of the Peoples Liberation Army; that is, the employment of forces other than those postulated as committed to the Southeast Asia invasion and the defense of South China.

FIGURE 1 (8)

COMPARISON OF FIREPOWER SCORES OF WEAPONS ORGANIC TO ARVN AND NVA INFANTRY BATTALIONS (C)

ARVN				NVA			
Weapon	LA/hrx10^{-10}	Number	Firepower Score	Weapon	LA/hrx10^{-10}	Number	Firepower Score
Rifle	.0001	319	.0319	Rifle	.0001	102	.0102
7.62mm MG	.0015	6	.0090	7.62mm LMG	.0015	27	.0405
3.5" RL	.0015	6	.0090	SMG	.0001	172	.0172
57mm RR	.0013	4	.0052	7.62mm HMG	.0019	15	.0285
40mm GL	.0008	9	.0072	75mm RR	.0027	3	.0081
60mm Mort	.0034	6	.0204	90mm RL	.0040	9	.0360
81mm Mort	.0214	4	.0856	82mm Mort	.0214	9	.1926
	Total Firepower Score		.1683		Total Firepower Score		.3331

Note 1. These firepower scores compare to a firepower score of .160 for the Viet Cong Battalion. On the basis that the value of one Viet Cong Battalion is 1.00, the ARVN Battalion (with support) equals 1.22 Viet Cong Battalion Equivalents and the NVA Battalion equals 2.08 Viet Cong Battalion equivalents

2. The NVA have a decided advantage over the ARVN battalions in the following categories of weapons: Machine Guns, Rocket Launchers, Mortars

The ARVN have a small advantage over the NVA battalions in the following categories: Rifles, Grenade launchers

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FIGURE 2 (S)

SUGGESTED CHANGES IN ARVN BATTALION WEAPONS (U)

Weapon	FPP	STAG Present No.	Old FPP	Add	Delete	New FPP
Rifle/ Carbine	.0001	319	.0319		101 a/	.0218
MG 7.62mm	.0015	6	.0090	15 b/		.0315
RL 3.5"	.0015	6	.0090			.0090
RR 57mm	.0013	4	.0052		4 c/	.0000
RR 75mm	.0027	0		6		.0162
RR 106mm	.0129	0		4 d/	0	.0516
GL 40mm	.0008	9	.0072	50		.0472
Mortar 60mm	.0034	6	.0204		6	.0000
Mortar 81mm	.0214	4	.0856	5 e/		.1926
Firepower Score			.1683			.3699

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a/ From the STAG computations, elimination of 101 rifles/ carbines will place the ARVN battalion on the same level of rifles as the NVA battalion

b/ The six machine guns are presently in the heavy weapons platoons of the rifle companies. The additional machine guns could be placed in the rifle platoons

c/ Replacement of the 57mm recoilless rifle by the 75mm recoilless rifle gives the ARVN battalion a capability more closely paralleling the NVA battalion

d/ Addition of the 106mm recoilless rifles will significantly increase the firepower of the battalion

e/ Will give the ARVN battalion the same mortar capability as the US battalions

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2. (TS) Concurrent with or subsequent to the Southeast Asia invasion, the CHICOMs could, in coordination with the North Koreans, launch an attack on South Korea. In this connection, however, current intelligence indicates that the CHICOMs could not sustain major campaigns on two fronts against a major power without outside logistical help or extensive prior stockpiling. An attack by the CHICOMs in another geographical area would subject all of China to air attack since it would broaden the conflict beyond the limited objective strategy. The CHICOMs would also run the risk that the Soviet Union might capitalize on the situation to improve its position in Northeast Asia. Moreover, based on recent changes in political orientation, it could be difficult for the CHICOMs to pursuade the North Koreans that involvement in a military adventure against the United States/United Nations is in their national interest.

3. (TS) A CHICOM attack on Taiwan or the offshore islands would have little effect against the US/Allied effort in Southeast Asia and could provoke US/Allied air and naval attacks beyond the limits visualized in the study strategies.

4. (TS) The commitment of additional CHICOM forces to Southeast Asia is also possible, particularly if the initial offensive bogs down or the US/Allies seize the initiative. If additional air forces are committed, South China airfields damaged earlier would have to be rendered operational and the warning and control equipment in the area restored. Because of continuous US restrikes on these facilities, the additional CHICOM aircraft would have to be committed piecemeal and would be more easily destroyed. In addition, a sizable air commitment to South China, without replacement from an outside source, would result in denuding the urban industrial areas of China of much of their air defense capability. Commitment of additional naval forces would constitute a temporary harassment only. Commitment of additional land forces to Southeast Asia is limited by the LOC structure. Even when assuming that variations exist between the estimated and actual capacities of the LOC, there is a definite limit to the number of CHICOM divisions that can be employed. No intelligence estimate to date has postulated a CHICOM force in Southeast Asia of greater than 34 divisions, including those which could advance on Rangoon. Commitment of additional forces within South China to counter the Bravo Strategy is a possibility. Again, however, the LOC limit the size of the force which can be employed.

Portions of the LOC required for countering the Bravo Strategy must also support Southeast Asia operations and other forces along the border of South China. In addition, the Yangtze River is a formidable barrier. Based on current CHICOM order of battle which locates two-thirds of its land force north of the Yangtze, great distances would have to be traversed in order to position these forces to meet the US/Allied invasion. Additionally, interdiction and armed reconnaissance would limit the CHICOM capability to move additional forces. Thus, while it is not possible to determine whether the CHICOMs would commit significant forces to operations against Korea or Taiwan or to predict the exact size of the CHICOM invasion force, the CHICOM force commitments postulated in the study strategies are reasonable.

F. (TS) TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES

1. (TS) In each of the strategies, it is judged that with the resources indicated, the limited objective of causing the CHICOMs to withdraw from Allied territory in Southeast Asia could be accomplished. The United States has in the past experienced only one direct major conflict with the CHICOMs. The result was a negotiated truce generally along the original battle line. Since the Korean conflict, the only indication that the CHICOMs might continue a useless conflict hoping to wear the enemy down by eventual attrition is in the pronouncements of the CHICOM leadership. No hard intelligence on CHICOM intentions is available, and history lends little support to the proposition that the CHICOMs would engage in such a losing effort.

2. (TS) Under the assumption that the CHICOM leaders are rational, it would be clear to them that, while they have not gained their objectives in Southeast Asia, the US response which thwarted their aims has been measured and limited. A rational leadership could decide that, as in Korea, a negotiated truce in which continued national existence is assured is more acceptable than the risk of urban industrial destruction. Such a decision would also be favored by the fact that the seizure of Southeast Asia is not necessary for the CHICOM survival.

3. (TS) If the CHICOM leadership acts less rationally, the conflict could continue. The United States could demonstrate the increasing cost of the struggle [redacted]

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4. (TS) It is impossible to judge the will of the CHICOM leadership and therefore difficult to determine the extent to which they would be willing to place their limited but growing industrial potential at risk. It is believed, however, that any one of the study strategies, when implemented, will, by being an effective counter to CHICOM aggression, strongly influence the CHICOMs to seek an early end to hostilities.

G. (TS) CHARLIE STRATEGY - "COMBINED FORCE ACTION - SOUTH"

1. (TS) Concept

a. The concept of Charlie Strategy mission is to conduct a land, sea and air campaign against mainland China and North Vietnam, while conducting holding operations in Southeast Asia in order to cause the CHICOMs to cease their military aggression. Minimizing the risk of Soviet involvement in direct military support of the CHICOMs or in military action elsewhere is a major consideration in the selection of objectives.

b. Together with holding operations in Southeast Asia, operations are conducted generally south of the line FORT BAYARD (Luichow Peninsula) - NAN-NING - K'UN-MING in order to destroy enemy forces, LOC and logistic complexes. Hainan Island is neutralized and the Hanoi complex seized. Additionally, CHICOM/NVN naval forces in the area of operations are neutralized and the coastal waters off South China and North Vietnam are controlled to prevent the introduction of materiel and supplies through southern CHICOM and North Vietnamese ports. Key targets which contribute to the CHICOM effort in Southeast Asia north of the FORT BAYARD - NAN-NING - K'UN-MING line are attacked on a highly selective basis.

2. (TS) Scope. Appendix G contains a detailed analysis of the Charlie Strategy including the force requirements and the anticipated capabilities to meet those requirements. The air battle and war at sea phases of Charlie Strategy, which are generally common to all strategies, are covered under a previous section of this report and are not discussed further here except in terms of their impact upon certain operations. The principal emphasis of the analysis is on the initial holding operations in the defense of Southeast Asia, the air interdiction effort and the subsequent amphibious/airborne operation to seize Hanoi in order to cut the major communist LOC in North Vietnam. To establish the setting, brief mention is made of the deployments and redeployments which are executed generally during the strategic warning post-decision period.

3. (TS) Redeployments and Deployments

a. Redeployments. In conformance with the strategy, certain intra-theater redeployments and repositioning of land, air and naval forces are ordered to meet the CHICOM/NVN threat. Other forces within the theater are earmarked for continued operations against the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese insurgency effort in South Vietnam. Still other forces are designated to prepare for the subsequent amphibious/airborne operations. Analysis of the CHICOM/NVN ground threat indicates that some nine US/Allied divisions should be redeployed to defensive positions in northern Thailand and South Vietnam across five critical enemy axes of advance in order to contain the communist forces forward of major US/Allied air and logistic bases. Screening forces are deployed as far forward of the main defensive positions as possible. War game results and independent analyses of other factors, not specifically considered in the war game, but relating to comparative force combat capability, indicate that of the nine US and Allied divisions deployed in the forward areas, approximately seven and one-third divisions adequately supported by tactical air forces are actually required along the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) to contain the enemy. Because of inherent uncertainties associated with war gaming and to insure a margin for possible upward variations in the threat, the remaining one and two-thirds divisions are retained locally as reserve forces (see Figure 20 for deployments).

b. In addition to the redeployment and repositioning of forces to forward defensive positions, certain additional land forces are redeployed from South Vietnam to Thailand to act as readily available in-country strategic reserves for commitment against any major CHICOM penetrations and to guard the Burma flank. Concurrently with the land force theater adjustments, naval/marine forces and tactical air forces are redeployed and repositioned to a better offensive/defensive posture from which to execute their roles in the Charlie Strategy.

[99]

FIGURE 20 (TS)

MAJOR DEPLOYMENTS D-DAY (U)



(1n)

c. Deployments. Anticipating requirements for forces beyond those in the theater of operations at the time of strategic warning, additional land, naval and tactical and strategic air forces are scheduled for deployment from CONUS and other theaters in accordance with their anticipated missions. Tactical air forces, both land- and sea-based, and additional naval forces are scheduled for early deployment in order to be prepared to execute their missions at the outset of hostilities. Additional land forces, both Army and Marine, and amphibious shipping and airlift are scheduled to arrive in sufficient time to execute the amphibious/airborne operation which occurs subsequent to the initial defense.

d. Logistics. Assessment of the logistical implications concerning the redeployments and deployments incident to Charlie Strategy indicates that, subject to some uncertainties, the planned operations can be executed. The principal uncertainty concerns the Thailand LOC. Although estimates indicate that with the planned improvements, these LOC can support the forces positioned in Thailand, there is uncertainty as to whether such improvements can be completed in the time frame of the strategy.

4. (TS) Defense of Southeast Asia

a. General. Three principal requirements for the successful defense of Southeast Asia are winning the air superiority battle, controlling the sea and containing the enemy land forces which have invaded Southeast Asia. The air battle and control of the sea have been previously addressed; this discussion highlights the containment of the ground threat.

b. Enemy Forces. The enemy threat is set forth in paragraph D, above.

c. US/Allied Forces. There are in Southeast Asia the equivalent of some 26 US/Allied divisions, including approximately nine and one-third US division equivalents. As indicated earlier, nine of these US/Allied divisions are positioned along the main defensive positions in North Thailand and Vietnam and include one and two-thirds divisions which are immediately available as local reserves.

Assuming about ten Allied divisions are involved with counterinsurgency operations for a substantial portion of the time, seven US/Allied divisions remain as a strategic reserve in Thailand and South Vietnam to counter any possible breakthroughs by the communist forces.

d. Concept of Operations. The concept of operations is to position minimum forces forward to contain the initial CHICOM/NVN threat in order to husband theater forces for an early decisive amphibious/airborne operation against the Hanoi complex. Examination of the US/Allied forces deployed forward indicates that, with the FPP gained by use of COFRAM munitions and when adequately supported by the tactical air forces, the seven and one-third division force is adequate to contain the enemy threat.

5. (TS) Interdiction Campaign

a. General

(1) The rationale for the Charlie Strategy interdiction campaign is based on reducing the combat capability of the engaged CHICOM land forces in Southeast Asia by reducing systematically the logistical throughput capacity of the LOC structure extending generally from the K'UN-MING - NAN-NING - CHAN-CHIANG (Fort Bayard) line on the north to the CHIANG RAI - VIENTIANE - PAK SANE - SAVANNAKHET - HUE line on the south. This primary effort against the LOC is supplemented by selective destruction of supply and ammunition depots, POL storage, and port and railroad facilities. It also includes extensive armed reconnaissance which contributes directly to achieving the objective of the interdiction effort.

(2) Examination of the intelligence estimate concerning the capacity of the LOC structure leading southward from China reveals that it limits either the size of the CHICOM/NVN force or its capability to engage in a high intensity of combat. The further south the LOC extends, the smaller the force it can support. Moreover, in the wet season of the southwest monsoon, there is a great reduction in the LOC capacity. Based on these factors, an attempt is made to interdict the LOC system with sufficient effectiveness either to cause reduction of

[102]

the force or to force it to operate at a lower level of combat. Analysis indicates that, if the LOC capacity could be reduced by 30 percent along the general line CHIANG RAI - VIENTIANE - PAK SANE - SAVANNAKHET - HUE, the CHICOM/NVN force would be reduced to 13 divisions or, alternatively, the operations of the 19 divisions would be curtailed to light combat. DIA defines light combat as light skirmishing between small units with no major units engaged.

b. Zonal Interdiction Plan. In order to accomplish the interdiction objective described above, four interdiction zones are selected in which sensitive route choke points are targeted. The zones selected run generally east-west and are located to contain the minimum north-south and lateral connecting roads and rail lines. Choke points on the roads are selected, whenever possible, so that the distances between them are great enough to make human or animal porterage generally impracticable yet close enough to make truck transport inefficient. This interdiction plan is depicted on Figure 21.

c. Additional Interdiction Targets. To supplement the LOC interdiction effort and extend the effectiveness of the overall interdiction program, certain other classes of targets, generally below the K'UN-MING - NAN-NING line, are targeted. These are: POL, supply and ammunition storage areas, additional railroad targets and ports. Overall sortie and munition requirements for the entire interdiction effort are summarized on Figures 22 through 25.

d. Armed Reconnaissance. The armed reconniassance effort in large measure focuses specifically on supplementing the zonal interdiction program. This is to minimize CHICOM/NVN efforts to reconstruct or bypass choke points and to reduce traffic between the points. Use of air-delivered COFRAM munitions and area denial weapons should measurably enhance the effort, particularly as the use of railroads and trucks becomes more limited and human and animal transport increases.

[103]

FIGURE 21 (TS)

CHARLIE STRATEGY INTERDICTION ZONES (U)



[104]

FIGURE 22 (S)

OVERALL INITIAL STRIKE MUNITIONS REQUIREMENTS (U)

	Type Weapons			
Target Systems	250# S.E.a/	500# S.E.	750# GPb/	MLU-10B c/
A. Zonal Highway Systems	0	11,090	0	0
B. Railroad Network	1,931	1,236	612	240
C. POL Storage Areas	468	903	0	0
D. Military Supply Depots	1,432	0	8,538	0
E. Ammunition Depots	2,185	101	1,800	0
F. Port Facilities	528	118	1,813	0
Totals	6,544	13,448	12,763	240

FIGURE 23 (S)

OVERALL RESTRIKE MUNITIONS REQUIREMENTS (MONTHLY BASIS) (U)

	Type Weapons			
Target Systems	250# S.E.a/	500# S.E.	750# GPb/	MLU-10Bc/
A. Zonal Highway Systems	0	39,924	0	0
B. Railroad Network	2,622	3,017	886	162
C. POL Storage Areas	307	95	0	0
D. Military Supply Depots	935	0	5,188	0
E. Ammunition Depots	2,185	101	1,800	0
F. Port Facilities	528	118	1,813	0
	6,577	43,255	9,687	162

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a/ SE - Snakeye
b/ GP - General Purpose Bomb
c/ MLU-10B - Railroad Mine

[105]

FIGURE 24 (S)

OVERALL INITIAL STRIKE SORTIE REQUIREMENTS (U)

Target Systems	Tactical	Strategic
A. Zonal Highway Systems	1,835	0
B. Railroad Network	350	12
C. POL Storage Areas	133	0
D. Military Supply Depots	268	123
E. Ammunition Depots	203	27
F. Port Facilities	70	29
Totals	2,859	191

FIGURE 25 (S)

OVERALL RESTRIKE SORTIE REQUIREMENTS (MONTHLY BASIS)(U)

Target Systems	Tactical	Strategic
A. Zonal Highway Systems	4,463	0
B. Railroad Network	625	18
C. POL Storage Areas	39	0
D. Military Supply Depots	178	91
E. Ammunition Depots	203	27
F. Port Facilities	70	29
Totals	5,578	165

[106]

e. Effectiveness. No methodology is available to assess precisely the effectiveness of air interdiction on the enemy. However, analysis, in which the capabilities of the CHICOMs to overcome the effect of the campaign is carefully examined on a best situation-worst situation basis, appears to offer the possibility of assessing effectiveness within a reasonable range. Based on such analysis, it is believed that at least a 30 to 40 percent reduction of LOC capacity is possible and that such a decrease would impose a considerable reduction in the capability of CHICOM/NVN forces to continue the invasion attempt in Southeast Asia.

6. (TS) Amphibious/Airborne Operation

a. The amphibious/airborne operation associated with this strategy has as its immediate objective the seizure of the key LOC hub of Hanoi in order to sever several of the major LOC supporting the CHICOM/NVN offensive to the south. It is estimated that as many as 12 of the 19 attacking communist divisions are supported by these LOC. Cutting these routes would have an early and a severely adverse impact on the enemy and his capability to sustain the offensive. Once US/Allied forces are across this significant supply line, the emphasis of the air interdiction effort is shifted to the west. Concurrently, the intensity of combat by US/Allied forces in Thailand and South Vietnam is raised in order to destroy or force the withdrawal of the CHICOM/NVN forces opposing them. This combination of ground and air effort places a great strain on remaining enemy LOC at a time when their capabilities on the three axes on the eastern flank of the line are being drastically reduced.

b. A total of eight US/Allied division-size forces are considered adequate to accomplish the objective of the amphibious/airborne mission (see Figure 26 for overall Allied dispositions). Three US divisions, two Marine and one Army airborne, make the initial assault and secure a beachhead in the vicinity of Thanh Hoa in North Vietnam. This action is planned to take place in the time frame D+3 to D+4 months. Immediate expansion of the beachhead, with the main effort to the north, is undertaken with a view to the rapid seizure of the Hanoi complex.

FIGURE 26 (TS)

ALLIED DEPLOYMENTS D+3 MONTHS (U)



[108]

Initially, a high level of close air support (CAS) is provided these forces, with each of the three assault divisions being allocated 100 effective CAS sorties daily through I+2 (US/Allied Invasion Day+2). This level of CAS, when combined with the use of COFRAM and the exploitation of available naval gunfire support, should initially permit a relatively rapid advance at a small cost in US casualties. An important consideration is the fact that the estimated enemy forces considered capable of countering the beachhead seizure are dispersed, precluding an immediate reaction on an orderly, massed basis. The piecemeal commitment, dictated by this postulated enemy situation, contributes to a rapid US/Allied success. Enemy dispositions are based on current order of battle; however, variations in their location should not be a major obstacle unless there is a prepared defense of the landing area. Beginning on I+2, three additional US division-size forces are phased into the operation. The war gaming and subsequent analysis of this six-division US force against an enemy threat of some nine and one-half divisions indicates that the seizure of Hanoi and subsequent defense of the area are feasible. Nevertheless, a game excursion is played in which the US/Allied force is confronted by a major communist threat consisting initially of North Vietnamese forces reinforced on a time-phased basis by some 22 CHICOM divisions. This latter force represents the maximum CHICOM mobilization capability after six months. In this excursion, the objective is reached and held by eight US/Allied divisions including two ARVN divisions. Further analysis of the original six-division force against the nine and one-half CHICOM/NVN division force indicates that one or two additional divisions in reserve would be sufficient to increase the assurance of holding the objective area.

c. The total personnel and tonnage requirements for this operation, phased into the beachhead area to minimize peak periods, is within the capability of the airlift and sealift which could be available at the time. Adequate cargo shipping is available. While personnel movements require the use of turnaround shipping, such movements are within planned phasing of troops into the beachhead. An uncertainty, however, concerns the availability of sufficient lighterage to move personnel and cargo between deep-draft ships and the beach. This possible shortfall can be offset by the use of indigenous lighterage and by exploiting the ship-to-shore capability of amphibious ships after the initial landing.

d. Upon securing Hanoi and the planned outer perimeter of the lodgment area, US/Allied forces assume a defensive posture. This action permits defense of the area and, at the same time, provides clear and visible evidence of the limited intent of the US/Allied strategy. The presence of these forces in the North Vietnamese capital, combined with the denial of a sizable amount of the materials and supplies necessary to the prosecution of the Southeast Asia war including the Viet Cong effort, should result in an early end to the aggression and the withdrawal of CHICOM forces to China.

7. (TS) Charlie Strategy Summary. An invasion of North Vietnam to seize the Hanoi logistic-communications complex combined with a holding action in Southeast Asia is a militarily feasible alternative for causing the CHICOMs to cease intervention in Southeast Asia. Based on the analysis contained in Appendix G, the following US/Allied objectives appear attainable:

a. A holding action in Southeast Asia can protect the forward vital air and logistic base complexes.

b. US/Allied forces can control the sea.

c. US/Allied air superiority can be gained and maintained.

d. With some augmentation of those air forces programmed for Southeast Asia in November 1967, a successful air interdiction campaign in Southeast Asia and South China, which reduces the logistic capability to support engaged CHICOM/NVN forces by at least 30 percent, can be expected.

e. A successful amphibious/airborne operation to seize the Hanoi complex can be mounted, thereby physically severing the major LOC supporting approximately two-thirds of the CHICOM/NVN force in Southeast Asia.

H. (TS) EVALUATION OF STRATEGIES

1. (U) General. Appendix H evaluates each of the three strategies and identifies the force and logistic requirements necessary to support each strategy. It also includes considerations related both directly and indirectly to the entire study. These have been discussed in Part V of this volume.

2. (TS) Method of Evaluation. Although each strategy is designed basically to accomplish the military objective of forcing the CHICOMs to withdraw, each is sufficiently different in concept to offer a choice based on the broader goals of United States national policy. It is in this context that the strategy options should be considered.

3. (TS) The Strategies

a. Strategic Implications

(1) Alpha Strategy. The Alpha Strategy offers an alternative whereby a US/Allied offensive can be conducted against mainland Communist China without committing US land combat forces to offensive operations. It also attacks a time sensitive target array directly related to the CHICOM national infrastructure and LOC which supports their aggression, and upon which severe damage can be inflicted by employment of nonnuclear weapons. Selection of the Alpha Strategy to counter CHICOM aggression in Southeast Asia relates to US national objectives as follows:

(a) It provides a limited objective alternative with sufficient force application to dissuade the CHICOMs from continuing their intervention in Southeast Asia.

(b) The strategy can be executed with reasonable force and resource availability on a timely basis.

(c) It provides an alternative strategy option wherein US land forces are not required to engage in a land war in mainland Communist China or North Vietnam.

(2) Bravo Strategy. The Bravo Strategy offers an alternative whereby US/Allied air, land and naval campaigns are carried to the mainland of China. If it is desired to strike China with combined military forces to demonstrate physically that the China mainland is not inviolate, this strategy provides a means. Selection of the Bravo Strategy to counter CHICOM aggression in Southeast Asia relates to US national objectives as follows:

(a) It provides a geographically limited objective strategy with sufficient force applications to cause the CHICOMs to cease overt aggression in Southeast Asia.

(b) It provides a strategy wherein presently programmed land combat forces are capable of conducting a successful holding action.

(c) It provides a strategy aimed directly at the China mainland.

(d) The strategy forces a CHICOM reevaluation of objectives, i.e., defense of the homeland versus a stalemate in Southeast Asia.

(3) Charlie Strategy. A combination of limited offensive operations in Southeast Asia and an amphibious/airborne operation which places forces across the principal LOC hub at Hanoi provides an effective means of causing early withdrawal of CHICOM/NVN forces from Southeast Asia. If the desired alternative is to cause this withdrawal using land operations within Southeast Asia and at the same time provide the foundation for a reunified Vietnam, the Charlie Strategy can accomplish these objectives with the active land forces presently programmed for late 1967. Selection of Charlie Strategy to counter CHICOM aggression in Southeast Asia relates to US national objectives as follows:

(a) It provides a limited objective strategy with sufficient force application to cause the CHICOMs to cease aggression in Southeast Asia.

[112]

(b) It provides a strategy wherein presently programmed active duty land combat forces are sufficient to execute both defensive and offensive operations. Selective mobilization and deployment of air and naval forces are necessary to execute the strategy.

(c) The invasion of North Vietnam can be executed in about three to four months time subsequent to the postulated date of CHICOM aggression.

b. Force and Logistic Requirements

(1) Alpha Strategy

(a) There is a requirement for the utilization of bases on Taiwan for tactical and strategic non-nuclear air operations. Such utilization provides a substantial operational capability, and is a major factor in the successful execution of the interdiction campaign.

(b) Mobilization of elements of the USAF Air National Guard is necessary to provide required tactical air augmentation forces on a timely basis.

(c) Utilization of USAFE F-4 aircraft resources in a trade-off with ANG F-84 aircraft constitutes a temporary degradation of NATO effectiveness. The deployment of two additional CVAs to the Pacific theater similarly constitutes a temporary drawdown on the NATO commitment.

(d) Use of additional available B-52 strategic forces would provide substantial additional flexibility and capability.

(e) Presently programmed US Army and US Navy active combat forces are adequate for execution of this strategy.

(f) Deployment of the remainder of the US Army 101st Airborne Division to Southeast Asia in November 1967 is required to increase the general reserve for support of the holding action or to augment counterguerrilla forces.

(g) The projected attrition of tactical aircraft and the relatively small replacement capability from current production levels indicate that long lead time pacing items should be procured early with a view toward expanded aircraft production to maintain the overall US force structure.

(h) Appropriate air munitions procurement and allocation actions are required to insure availability of sufficient resources for the 180-day interdiction program.

(2) Bravo Strategy

(a) With the acceptance by the national authority that the CHICOMs will attack, mobilization of Army Reserve Components consisting of six divisions and two brigades plus supporting forces is required. Deployment of these units, plus the two Army airborne divisions and the 5th Marine Division from CONUS, is required to execute Bravo Strategy. The 4th Marine Division is also mobilized. The use of six GRC divisions could reduce the US requirement by three divisions. However, these GRC divisions would require US support.

(b) Naval Reserve Components are mobilized, particularly amphibious and sealift ships.

(c) Air Force Reserve airlift units and National Guard tactical fighter units are mobilized and deployed. USAFE F-4 replacement with ANG F-84s constitutes a temporary degradation of NATO effectiveness as does the deployment of two additional CVAs to WESTPAC.

(d) Use of available additional B-52 strategic forces would provide substantial additional flexibility and capability to insure sufficient sorties to meet the requirements of the interdiction campaign.

(e) Postulated attrition of tactical aircraft requires a review of presently scheduled procurement of long lead time items.

[114]

(f) Inasmuch as some resources required are greater than those provided for in current programs, any reduction in these programs would affect adversely the US capability to implement the strategy.

(g) If mobilization is ordered prior to October 1967, it would improve the US readiness to react against the postulated threat and might deter the CHICOM aggression.

(3) Charlie Strategy

(a) No mobilization of land forces is needed to meet the specific requirements to execute the strategy.

(b) Three additional active duty divisions have to be deployed to Southeast Asia to execute the strategy. Two reserve divisions may be required to achieve an optimum world-wide force posture to meet other JSOP contingencies.

(c) Except for amphibious type ships, current active naval assets are adequate to satisfy strategy requirements. Some drawdown of Atlantic Fleet resources and mobilization of selected reserve ships are required to execute the amphibious operations of the strategy.

(d) Mobilization of ANG resources is required and the USAFE F-4 assets are deployed to Southeast Asia. The use of ANG F-84s as USAFE replacement aircraft constitutes a temporary degradation of NATO air force effectiveness as does the deployment of two additional CVAs to WESTPAC.

(e) Anticipated attrition requires a review of scheduled aircraft production and long lead time items.

(f) The associated risks related to timely execution of the Charlie Strategy amphibious operations depend on actions taken prior to the postulated time of strategic decision.

(g) Any reduction in presently programmed forces or any delay in procuring necessary materiel and logistic support could delay execution of the Charlie Strategy up to 12 months.

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[117]

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1.3(a)(1),(2),(3),(4),(5)

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{118}

1.3(a),(1),(2),(3),(4),(5)

[115]

1.3(a),(1),(2),(3
(4),(5)

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1.3(a),(1),(2)
(3),(4),(5)

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(1013)

1.3(a),(1),(2),(3),
(4),(5)

[122]

1.3(a),(1),(2),(3),(4),(5)

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[123]

1.3(a),(1),(2),(3),(4),(5)

[124]

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1.3(a)(1),(2),(3),(4),(5)

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[125]

13(a)(1),(2),(3),(4)(5)

{126}

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J. ~~(TS)~~ EFFECT OF THE LOSS OF US BASE RIGHTS IN JAPAN

1. ~~(TS)~~ General. Appendix J assesses the impact resulting from the loss of US base rights in Japan upon the US strategies under consideration in the study. Included in this assessment is the impact of the loss of Japanese industrial support and services. It is assumed that the use of bases for any type of support for operations against the CHICOMs in Southeast Asia is stopped as a result of the position taken by the Government of Japan. Further, procurement and shipment of anything that could be considered as munitions or other military support from Japan for US use against Communist China or CHICOM forces is prohibited.

2. ~~(TS)~~ Operational Considerations. The present US base structure in Japan exists to provide assistance to Japan in air defense, to support UN forces in Korea in the event of the resumption of hostilities [redacted] 1.3(a)(1) Forces based in Japan for these combat operational missions relate to the study strategies only indirectly as posture forces. The exception is Navy reconnaissance and ASW aircraft which are included in the study operations for US/Allied control of the sea.

3. ~~(S)~~ Logistic Considerations. The existing base structure in Japan is examined from a logistic viewpoint along service lines. It is apparent that significant PACOM logistic assets are located in Japan. This is particularly true of POL where the estimated average storage capacity is 25 percent of the PACOM total. There is also considerable hospital support which if lost would probably result in a change to the current 60-day theater evacuation policy.

4. ~~(S)~~ Industrial Support and Services. All services rely to some degree on Japanese industry for procurement and repair. While only a relatively small portion of Japanese industrial potential is currently utilized by the US military services, utilization is increasing directly as requirements in Southeast Asia increase and could become substantial. The Navy has the largest stake in industrial Japan for aircraft rebuild and the availability of ship repair facilities.

5. ~~(S)~~ Impact of Alternatives. Loss of US base rights in Japan would have an impact on the PACOM logistic system of all services. The primary purpose of US bases in Japan is to support logistically operations plans to meet the threat in Northeast Asia. This is of importance to the concept of the study strategies not only because of increased readiness requirements for the forces assigned, particularly in Korea, but also to maintain the credibility of these forces in order to tie down the CHICOM defenses. In addition, these bases have a secondary capability to support operations in other WESTPAC areas. The capability of these bases to meet emergency pipeline demands in general support and in POL is of importance but not critical. Alternatives to bases in Japan include expansion and increased use of bases in other countries, forward basing, floating depots and increased dependence on CONUS with consequent expansion of the supply pipeline. However, much of the infrastructure required to support the postulated strategies must be located, in any case, in other countries, regardless of the base rights situation in Japan. The loss of Japanese industrial support might well be the most significant factor and would have some impact on overall logistic support. This is true because the alternative, for the most part, is reliance on much more costly US resources. In summary, loss of base rights in Japan would not be a critical blow to support of the operations envisaged in this study.

K. ~~(TS)~~ [redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

[128]